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This  paper  examines  whether  local  public  expenditures  on  services  to  functionally  impaired 
individuals crowd out other local public expenditures in Sweden. Over the last ten years, these 
expenditures have increased by more than 90 percent while other municipal expenditures have 
experienced increases of up to 30 percent. The impact of expenditures on functionally impaired 
individuals is tested on five different spending areas using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) fixed-
effects model. While the results give no support for crowding out in the areas of social assistance, 
culture & leisure, and childcare & preschool, a negative relationship on spending for elderly & 
disabled care and education is found, suggesting that crowding out indeed occurs within the 
municipal sector. The negative relationships are significant both in a statistical and an economic 
sense.  
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines whether local public expenditures on one particular service tend to crowd 
out other local public expenditures. The specific service studied here, services to functionally 
impaired individuals, became the responsibility of the municipalities via a reform in 1994. At the 
same time, a new law imposed by the national government was implemented. The law, called the 
LSS-act
1, is an entitlement law geared towards individuals with functional impairments.
2 Since the 
reform and the implementation of the LSS -act, there has been a considerable increase in the 
expenditures on services to functionally impaired individuals. Reforms and decentralization of 
public activities are meant to increase efficiency and accountability to the local government. This 
is  one  of  the  main  theoretical  arguments  for  decentralizing  public  activities;  the  local 
governments are in a better position to provide basic services because they are better informed 
about  individual  demands  than  the  national  government  (Oates,  1972).  When  a  national 
government imposes new services and responsibility on the local governments, appropriate 
funding is not always provided. If not, this could also affect other areas of the local government. 
With new responsibilities and with a limited budget, the local government must prioritize its 
public service provision in other ways than previously. In such cases, expenditures on one type of 
service could crowd out expenditures on other services; thereby affecting t he level of services 
provided  in  the  other  areas.  Naturally,  this  could  happen  without  new  regulations  or 
decentralization – for example, expenditures on health care continue to increase throughout the 
world, which puts a burden on government budget and spending allocation. Similarly, the elderly 
population is growing larger, which also puts a burden on government budgets.   
 
It is important to study what are the effects of reforms and new services on how expenditures are 
determined within the local government. First, it is important in order to identify the area(s) 
within the local governments that are affected by new national government policies, such as 
decentralization or reforms of public service provision, especially areas that may not be directly 
associated with the reform or policy. Second, if some categories of public service provision are 
strongly regulated, will this cause expenditure in other areas to be crowded out? That is, are 
certain categories of spending more prone to expenditure crowding out than others? It would be 
important to identify these areas when implementing reforms or nationally imposed services. 
                                                       
1 LSS-act = Act on Support and Services for Certain Disabled Persons, LSS 1993:387. 
2  Throughout  this  paper,  the  terms  “services  for  functional  impaired”  and  “LSS  services”  are  used 
interchangeably. Similarly, “LSS expenditures” and “expenditure on services to functionally impaired” are 
also used interchangeably. 2 
 
 
Empirical research on public expenditure is usually based on the seminal work of Borcherding 
and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), where the demand for local public 
services is regarded as a function of the characteristics of the median voter. The expenditure 
problem for the local government is then treated in a similar way as consumer choices in the 
private sector. In empirical applications, determinants also include economic, demographic and 
geographical characteristics of the local government, for example tax base, population size, age 
structure, intergovernmental grants, as well as other institutional and socio-economic factors. 
This  work  was  later  extended  by  Deacon  (1978)  to  include  the  composition  of  public 
expenditure.  Local  expenditures  (and  services)  can  also  be  related  to  other  tiers  of  the 
government. Aronsson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000) show that local public expenditure is not 
only explained by local government characteristics but could also be explained by the service 
provision/expenditures of the regional level government; the expenditure decisions at different 
levels are interdependent. These studies, among others, show that an expenditure decision in one 
area affects expenditure decisions in other areas, either within the local government or among 
different tiers of governments.  
 
Previous studies dealing with expenditure crowding out have found no or only limited support 
for the crowding out hypothesis. For example, Fossett and Wyckoff (1996) studied the impact on 
spending  on  public  education  of  increasing  spending  on  Medicaid.  Their  results  show  no 
significant effect on educational expenditures. Instead, their findings indicate that changes in 
educational spending respond to changes in the states’ own-source revenue rather than increases 
in Medicaid spending. McCarty and Schmidt (1997) use a vector autoregressive framework to 
study whether interaction in expenditures from six government spending categories shows any 
evidence  of  crowding  out;  they  find  no  support  for  the  crowding  out  hypothesis.  Rather, 
increases in spending in one category are paid for by increases in tax revenue rather than being 
due to crowding out of other expenditures. Finally, the most recent study (to my knowledge), 
Landon,  McMillan,  Muralidharan  and  Parsons  (2006),  uses  a  panel  of  Canadian  data  and 
examines whether health care spending crowds out other provisional government spending and, 
as in the previous studies, it finds no support for the crowding out hypothesis.
3 
 
                                                       
3 See also the studies of Brazer and McCarty (1986) and Marlow and Shiers (1999); the first is a study of 
the “municipal overburden” hypothesis and the second concerns the effect of law enforcement spending 
on education spending. Neither of the studies finds support for expenditure crowding out. 3 
 
The hypothesis to be investigated in this paper is whether increased expenditures – due to a 
nationally  imposed  reform  –  in  one  area  affect  other  expenditure  areas  within  the  local 
government.  More  specifically,  does  the  expenditure  on  services  to  functionally  impaired 
individuals crowd  out other municipal expenditures? Although  the  local  government  has the 
autonomy to set its own local tax rates, the income from taxes does not fully cover the municipal 
service provision.
4 Moreover, the excess burden of an increase in the tax rate is greater with 
higher tax rates; therefore, it could be very costly if municipalities would further increase the local 
tax rate (since the tax rates already are high in Sweden). This is why municipalities are reluctant to 
increase the tax rates. Consequently, when an area within the local government experiences high 
increases in expenditures, other areas are likely to be affected. In that sense, thi s study differs 
from previous studies on expenditure crowding out. 
 
The crowding out hypothesis will be tested on five spending categories of the municipalities: 
elderly & disabled care; education; social assistance, childcare & preschool; and culture & le isure. 
These five categories make up the majority of municipal spending (about 90 percent); where the 
total expenditures of the municipalities in Sweden amounted to 423 billion SEK in 2007. The 
responsibility to perform care and services for individuals with functional impairment became the 
responsibility of the municipalities (transferred from the county councils) via a reform in 1994. 
Ever since this reform, there has been a significant increase in the expenditures for services to 
functionally impaired, and the burden of the rise in the expenditure has had a considerable effect 
on municipalities. Over the last ten years, the expenditures for functionally impaired have 
increased by more than 90 percent while other municipal expenditures have experienced 
increases of between 15 and 30 percent. However, this does not constitute any evidence of 
expenditure crowding out; it could just reflect other reasons for why there has been an increase in 
this  expenditure.  To  support  the  crowding  out  hypothesis,  increases  i n  expenditure  for 
functionally impaired must have negative effects on other expenditures in such a way that this 
cannot be explained by other factors determining the expenditures.  
 
Following earlier literature on expenditure crowding out, this paper aims at empirically examining 
the crowding out hypothesis on Swedish municipal expenditure data.  The contribution of this 
paper is twofold; first, it adds to the literature on local public expenditure by analyzing the effect 
of a nationally imposed reform on lo cal public expenditures in Sweden. Second, the increased 
                                                       
4 Income from taxes covered about 68 percent of the municipal service provision in 2007. Source: 
Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR).  4 
 
demand for publicly provided services (due to the growing share of elderly and increasing health 
care expenditures, for example) increases the pressure on the public service budget. So, this topic 
is indeed important with regards to expenditures and public policy in Sweden. It could also be 
important in other countries experiencing an increased demand for public services.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes municipal characteristics and 
expenditure patterns in Sweden; Section 3 describes and discusses the hypotheses and the data. 
Section 4 describes and discusses the empirical specification and the method. Section 5 presents 
the empirical findings, while concluding remarks can be found in section 6. 
 
2.  Municipality Services and Expenditures 
Sweden is divided into 290 municipalities and 21 counties. Municipalities are responsible for 
public activities such as social services, elderly care, education and infrastructure. The main task 
of the counties is to provide healthcare. There is no hierarchical relation between municipalities 
and counties since they are responsible for different activities.
5 Some of the municipality activities 
are regulated by law or have guidelines; wh ile other municipality activities are provided for on a 
voluntary basis. For example, the municipalities are legally responsible for providing social 
services, elderly care, support for disabled, primary and secondary education, and water and 
sewerage.  Although  legally  responsible,  the  municipalities  have  some  flexibility  to  decide 
themselves how to perform their duties and distribute the resources. Leisure activities, cultural 
activities
6 and industrial and commercial services are examples of activities that the municipalities 
provide on a voluntary basis without any regulations.  
 
In Figure 1, the distribution of all municipal expenditures for the year 2004 is presented. The year 
is chosen to represent an average year within the time frame of the study. The municipal service 
expenditure is divided into six main categories: care and  service for elderly & disabled and 
functionally impaired; education; childcare & preschool; social assistance; culture & leisure; and a 
residual category. The five first categories constitute 90 percent of the total spending of 
municipalities. The residual   category consists of various expenditures grouped together (e.g. 
                                                       
5 The only exception is Gotland, where the municipality also has the responsibilities normally associated 
with a county council.  
6 Except for the provision of libraries in the municipalities. 5 
 
infrastructure,  environmental  protection,  tourism),  which  makes  up  about  ten  percent  of 
municipalities’ total spending.   
 
 





As can be seen in the figure, expenditures on education and expenditures on elderly & disabled 
and functionally impaired individuals are the two largest service areas within municipalities; each 
constitutes one third of the total spending of the municipalities.
7 The social service sector of the 
municipalities includes care and services for elderly & disabled and functionally impaired; but it 
also contains social assistance for individuals and families . The latter includes, for example, 
welfare assistance, help and services for children and young people, families, individuals abusing 
drugs or alcohol, and women who have been subjected to violence.
8  
 
Service and care for elderly &  disabled includes accommodations for those in need of special 
support. For example, the municipalities must arrange housing for people who, for physical or 
mental  reasons,  encounter  considerable  difficulties  in  their  daily  lives  and  need  special 
accommodation.  Services  to  individuals  with  functional  impairments  are  regulated  in  an 
                                                       
7 Services to elderly & disabled and services to functionally impaired belong to the same overall service 
area;  however,  the  municipal  expenditure  data  differentiate  between  the  two  groups  which  makes  it 
possible to study the effect of expenditure on services to functionally impaired individuals. 
8 The measures may be advice, financial aid, family law or family counseling. In special cases, certain 
measures can be implemented without the individual's consent. This applies to care of children and young 
people and care of adult drug and alcohol abusers. 
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entitlement law, the LSS-act. Included in the LSS-act are services such as personal assistance, 
special housing accommodation, contact persons and daily activities (National Board of Health 
and Welfare, NBHW). 
 
The expenditure on services to functionally impaired amounts to almost one third of the total 
spending on elderly & disabled and functionally impaired. To put this into a context, about 0.6 
percent of the Swedish population received services according to the LSS-act, while the number 
of potential users of elderly care (individuals aged above 75) amounted to about 8.7 percent; this 
can give us an idea of how expensive the LSS service provision is for the municipalities. As 
already mentioned, there has been a sharp increase in the expenditure on LSS over the years since 
it was first implemented.  
 





In Figures 2 and 3, the municipal expenditure for each sector is presented (in real terms). While 
Figure  2  shows  the  composition  of  expenditures  during  1998-2007,  Figure  3  shows  the 
development in expenditures as compared to the year 1998. LSS expenditure is separated from 
spending on the elderly & disabled for illustrative purposes, in order to see exactly how much 
























As is evident in the figures, not only does care for elderly & disabled and functionally impaired 
have the highest spending, it is also the area within the municipality experiencing the highest 
increase in its expenditure. While the expenditures for elderly & disabled care increased by 30 
percent during the period 1998-2007, LSS expenditure increased by more than 90 percent.
9 As a 
reference, it can be mentioned that during the same period, there was an increase in the tax base 
of 32 percent. 
 





Although it is evident that there has been a considerable increase in spending on LSS services and 
they are taking a larger share of the municipal budget, this could just be the result of spending 
readjustments,  reflecting  changes  in  demand  for  different  public  services.  Since  both  the 
expenditure  for  the  elderly  &  disabled  and  expenditure  for  the  functionally  impaired  have 
increased,  this  may  just  reflect  that  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  elderly  population. 
Therefore, to support the crowding out hypothesis, the distribution of expenditures must be such 
that the areas on which there is a negative impact of LSS expenditure would have received more 
resources and a higher level of spending had it not been for the potential burden of the LSS 
expenditure.  
   
                                                       
























3.  Hypothesis and Data  
The crowding out hypothesis will be tested on five broad spending areas: spending on elderly & 
disabled care; education; childcare & preschool; social assistance; and culture &  leisure. This 
section  starts  out  with  a  discussion  of  the  crowding  out  hypothesis,  and  why  increased 
expenditures on services to functionally impaired could affect each of the five spending areas. 
The section ends with a presentation of the data. 
 
Crowding out hypothesis  
The hypothesis to be tested in this paper is if expenditures on services to functionally impaired 
crowd  out other municipality  spending. When  the local  government is faced with increasing 
expenditure in one area, due to a national reform, decentralization of public services, new laws, or 
just an increasing share of demand for some services, the municipality must redistribute the given 
resources  within  their  set  budget.  The  municipal  budget  is  limited  in  the  sense  that  the 
municipality’s  own  source  of  income,  taxes,  does  not  fully  cover  the  municipal  service 
provision.
10 And although the local governments in Sweden have the autonomy to set their own 
local tax rates, the excess burden of an increase in the tax rate could be very high for the 
municipalities, thus making it difficult to motivate further tax increases.
11 Therefore, with new 
areas  of  responsibilities  and  with  a  limited  budget,  the  municipalities  may  be  forced  to 
redistribute their resources from one area to another.  
 
When municipalities redistribute their resources, it is not likely that every area will be affected in 
the same way. One reason why the effect will not be the same is that the cost associated with 
decreasing resources is different in different areas. As discussed in the  previous section, most of 
the municipalities’ duties are regulated by law or there are guidelines; therefore, if a service is 
strictly regulated, the cost of not providing the service could be very high. First, not providing the 
service could lead to lawsuits and fines. Second, deviating from a given norm could also be costly; 
this would send a negative signal to both voters (perhaps not to reelect the politicians) and 
potential individuals moving to this municipality. Individuals have preferences on what they want 
their  local  governments  to  provide,  such  as  level  of  education  and  recreational  services. 
                                                       
10 Municipal income also consists of governmental grants, tax equalization, and fees. 
11 Moreover, different measures for restricting the municipalities in increasing their own tax rate have been 
in  place  during  the  1990’s.  During  1991-1993,  it  was  prohibited  to  increase  the  tax  rate.  In  1994, 
municipalities that did not increase their tax rate received economic compensation. During 1997-1999, 
municipalities that increased the tax rate received less governmental grants (Halápi, 2008). 9 
 
Individuals  choose  to  migrate  and  live  in  areas  whose  local  government  best  satisfy  their 
preferences. This argument was originally presented by Tiebout (1956). In a migration study on 
Swedish data, Dahlberg, Eklöf, Fredriksson and Jofre-Monseny (2008) examine the impact of 
local public services on migration behavior. They find that given taxes, high spending on child 
care  and  “other”  expenditures  (i.e.  culture,  parks  and  recreations,  welfare  assistance,  and 
administration) attract migrants, while they do not find any conclusive result on elderly care and 
education.  
 
The size of a service area is another reason that determines if an area will be affected by the 
increased expenditure. It may be less noticeable to decrease resources in a large service area than 
in a small area. The marginal disutility of a decrease in total expenditure in a large area is likely to 
be less than in smaller area. Therefore, it is likely that the resource allocation (and/or crowding 
out) would be from a larger area where it may be easier to decrease spending without greatly 
affecting the service provision. A third reason why different areas can be differently affected is 
that expenditure decisions within the local government or between different tiers of governments 
(for example, local and regional level) are interdependent (Aronsson et al., 2000).
12 When there is 
an issue of non-separability between two publicly provided services, they can either be substitutes 
or compliments to each other. If the services are substitutes, an increase in the expenditure in 
one area will then decrease the expenditure in the other area, via reduced demand. On the other 
hand, if the services are complementary, then increased demand for one service will also increase 
the demand for the other service, thus increasing the expenditure in both areas.   
 
Elderly & disabled  
There  are at least three  reasons why the  first  spending  area  –  elderly  &  disabled  – may be 
crowded out by LSS expenditure. First, services to elderly & disabled belong to the same service 
area as services to the functionally impaired; and people eligible for services according to the 
LSS-act  may have  had services covered  by  the  elderly  &  disabled area,  but are now  instead 
receiving services according to the LSS-act. In such cases, the services to functionally impaired 
individuals may be viewed as a substitute for the care to elderly & disabled. Second, the care for 
                                                       
12Aronsson et al. (2000) study if county (regional) expenditures affect municipal (local) expenditures. In 
their model, county expenditure can affect municipal expenditures via a tax base effect (using the same 
source of revenue) and a direct effect (in the cases where the expenditures at the county level and the 
municipal  level  are  non-separable).  Their  result  suggests  a  positive  correlation  between  county  and 
municipal expenditures. This implies that municipal and county expenditures are complements in the 
utility function and/or that county expenditures and private consumption are substitutes.  10 
 
elderly & disabled is regulated by the Social Service Act (SoL 2001:453), which is a law, but not as 
strong as the LSS-act. Third, the elderly & disabled area is the largest sector of the municipalities. 
For  these  reasons,  some  resources  from  the  elderly  &  disabled  service  area  are  likely  to  be 
allocated to services to functionally impaired.  
 
Education  
For  the  second  spending  area,  education,  LSS  expenditure  may  also  crowd  out  spending. 
Education is the second largest sector of the municipal service provision, and although this is an 
area that affects a group of individuals having strong preferences for school quality, education 
may still be an area affected by the high LSS expenditures. Since this is a large spending area, it 
may  not  be  very  noticeable  when  there  are  decreases  in  total  expenditure  for  education. 
Therefore, it is likely that the education sector is affected when resources are to be redistributed 
within the municipality. 
 
Social assistance 
The third spending area, social assistance, is part of the same large social sector as elderly & 
disabled and functionally impaired. Therefore, if the LSS service area requires more resources, 
some of the resources may be redistributed from social assistance. On the other hand, social 
assistance is regulated in the Social Service Act and there is a strict lower limit on the level of 
welfare and assistance. Therefore, it may not be possible for municipalities to crowd out social 
assistance resources. In addition, social assistance represents a minor part of the budget; it may 
be difficult to decrease the resources without greatly affecting the provision. 
 
Childcare & preschool 
Childcare & preschool may or may not be affected by the LSS expenditure; the spending does 
not constitute a large share of the total municipal budget. Similar to the education area, childcare 
& preschool is also an area where there might be strong preferences in the community for a high 
quality of services. However, contrary to the education area though, childcare & preschool only 
constitute a smaller share of the total municipal budget, therefore, it may be more difficult to 





Culture & leisure 
The last spending area, culture & leisure, is the only area  in which provision is unregulated. If 
municipalities are short of resources, they could use money allocated to culture & leisure, since 
there is no law regulating this provision. However, the budget share for culture and leisure is 
rather  modest,  and  municipalities  may  not  want  to  decrease  this  level  in  order  to  allocate 
resources to other areas. Culture & leisure is an area that is highly visible in a municipality, 
besides being an area that many people care about; therefore, municipalities may be reluctant to 
decrease spending here. If spending on culture & leisure were to decrease, it may send a signal to 
the  inhabitants  about  the  performance  of  the  municipality,  which  may  not  be  viewed  as 
favorable. Furthermore, for those inhabitants with strong preference for culture & leisure, with a 
decrease in the spending area they may choose to migrate to other regions providing culture & 
leisure that better satisfy their preference instead.  
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
The  data  set  consists  of  288  municipalities  over  the  time  period  1998-2007.  The  public 
expenditure  variables  are  expressed  as  expenditure  per  capita,  measured  in  Swedish  kronor 
(SEK). All monetary variables are adjusted to the 2007 year price level using the consumer price 
index, CPI.  
 
To make comparisons of the impact of LSS expenditures, the dependent variable is defined in 
the same way for all five categories. The explanatory variables include municipality-level variables 
in order to control for differences in basic economic conditions among the municipalities. The 
explanatory variables included in the study are standard in studies of local public expenditure, i.e. 
tax base, intergovernmental grants
13 and long-term debt. The percent of unemployed and the 
share of the population on welfare benefits are also included, as are the population shares of 
different age groups. The local budget for a particular year is decided in November the previous 
year and  thus,  all  municipal  characteristics’  are  lagged  one  time  period,  since  this  is  the 
information that contains economic and demographic conditions for the previous years. For the 
elderly & disabled spending equation, two additional explanatory variables are included. These 
two  variables  are  included  to  capture  the  difference  in  cost  for  the  services  and  care  (it  is 
                                                       
13 The grant variable is defined as the total sum of grants, per capita. The composition of grants to the 
municipalities changed during the time period studied. Until 2004, the grants consisted of general grants 
and intramunicipal equalization. From 2005, the general grant is part of the income equalization grant/fee.  12 
 
significantly more costly to provide special residence for elderly, than to provide care and service 
to elderly in their own home). Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1, and 
variable definition and data sources for the variables are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
As will be discussed section IV, to account for simultaneity and endogeneity when testing the 
hypothesis of LSS expenditure crowding out other municipal spending, instrumental variables are 
needed that directly affect LSS expenditure but not expenditure for the dependent variable(s). 
The instruments that will be used are the three most important determining factors for LSS 
expenditure. The three instruments are: the number of individuals in a municipality that receive 
LSS services (per 10000 inhabitants), the share of individuals receiving LSS services that lives in 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 1999-2007  
    1999-2007    1999  2007 
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev  Min  Max     Mean  Mean 
Dependent variable                
  Elderly & Disabled care spending  10696  3023  2723  24599    9462  11650 
  Childcare & Preschool spending  5121  1032  2855  9730    4714  5847 
  Education spending  14336  1727  7682  21924    12832  15144 
  Social Assistance spending  2310  805  559  5880    2118  2521 
  Culture & Leisure spending  2081  533  537  4944    1977  2200 
Explanatory variables                 
 
Expenditures for services for 
functionally impaired (LSS)  3725  1334  223  9658    2730  4538 
  Home service (Elderly care) percent  8.3  2.4  0  30    7.8  11.9 
  Special residence (Elderly care) percent  7.1  1.8  1.4  14.9    7.9  5.9 
Municipal and Socioeconomic explanatory  variables 1998-2006         
  Tax base   124229  19717  83755  267155    108089  141718 
   Grants  8524  4891  -16399  24700    9054  7808 
  Debt (long-term)  11103  11166  0  78252    9743  11450 
  Population, log  4.3  0.4  3.4  5.9    4.3  4.3 
  Welfare, percent  4.5  1.9  0  15.8    6.3  3.8 
  Unemployment, percent  3.9  1.4  0.9  11    4.9  3.4 
  Population age 0-6, percent  7.3  1.1  4.7  11.8    8.1  7.2 
  Population age 7-15, percent  12.2  1.2  6.5  16.4    12.2  11.2 
  Population age 75+, percent  9.7  2.2  2.8  16    9.5  9.9 
Instruments for LSS expenditure             
  LSS Daily Activity, percent   44.7  12  0  100    44.7  46.6 
  LSS Adult Residential home, percent  35.1  12  0  72    35.6  35.4 
   LSS individuals per 10000 inhabitants   59.1  18  10  160     52.6  64.4 
Note: All monetary units are measured in Swedish kronor (SEK) and adjusted to the 2007 price level 
using CPI. Each dependent variable as well as the LSS expenditure is measured in per capita terms. 
The variables tax base, grants, and debt are also measured in per capita terms.  13 
 
“adult residential homes” (the most expensive service), and the share of individuals receiving LSS 
services that gets the service “daily activity” (the most common service). The properties of the 
instruments will also be discussed in section IV. 
 
Merged data and missing observations 
Today, Sweden consists of 290 municipalities; however, during the time period studied in this 
paper, two municipalities have seceded (Nykvarn in 1999 and Knivsta in 2003) from two other 
municipalities. In order not to lose observations or geographical data, the seceded municipalities 
have been merged back with their respective “original” municipalities in this study. Expenditure 
data are missing for a few observations (approximately 20 observations out of a total of 17280 
observations). In lieu of the missing values, I have used the mean of the previous and following 
year; i.e. when the missing value was for the year 1998, I used the value for 1999. The result of 
the estimation is unaffected whether I include or exclude these observations. Due to the sensitive 
nature of the LSS data, values for municipalities that only have one, two, or three individuals with 
a particular LSS service are not available. Therefore, the value two is used in lieu of the non-
available data. For a detailed description of LSS services and expenditure, see Birkelöf (2008). 
 
4.  Empirical specification and method  
A standard empirical model for determining government expenditure is usually expressed in a 
linear specification. Following this approach, a fixed-effects model of municipal spending that 
accounts for time and municipal individual effects can be estimated by the equation





it municipal year L X C
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where: 
EXP
it C  is per capita spending for the five spending categories 
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it X 1  is a vector of socioeconomic and municipal characteristics
15  
EXP
it L  is per capita expenditure for services to functionally impaired 
DAY HOME IND L L L , ,  are variables determining the LSS expenditure.  
                                                       
14 The results are robust to the choice between a linear and a log-linear empirical model: a logarithm 
version of the equation yields the same sign and significance of the coefficients. 
15 Additional explanatory variables for elderly care are included for the spending category “Elderly & 
disabled care spending” (the variables are measured at time t for municipality i).  14 
 
 
The inclusion of L in equation (1) allows LSS spending to have a direct impact on expenditures 
for the spending category studied, while holding other factors determining that category constant, 
as would be suggested by the crowding out hypothesis. However, since all five categories studied 
here are services provided by the municipalities, the resources are allocated from the same overall 
budget. That is, the expenditure for some or all of the spending categories may be simultaneously 
decided with the expenditure for LSS. In such a case, LSS spending is endogenous and it is 
correlated with the error term in equation (1). When a right-hand side variable is correlated with 
the error term, it implies that using OLS yields biased and inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2002; 
Green, 2003). If the LSS expenditure is endogenous in the expenditure equation(s), the OLS will 
underestimate the impact of LSS expenditure (in absolute terms); i.e. the estimated effect will be 
too modest. Therefore, to correct for the  simultaneity  bias in  the  equation,  the  endogenous 
variable, LSS expenditure, must be replaced with variables that are highly correlated with the LSS 
expenditure but not correlated with the error term in equation (1).  
 
One  way  of  correcting  for  the  simultaneity  bias  is  to  use  instrumental  variables  for  the 
endogenous explanatory variable and then using the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimation 
method. The instruments used in this study are the three most important determining factors for 
LSS expenditure; the number of individuals with LSS services and two of the services provided. 
The LSS variables are argued to be exogenous to the spending category studied, for example, 
spending on elderly & disabled. However, one might ask why LSS expenditure is endogenous, 
while factors determining LSS expenditures are exogenous? This is due to the characteristics of 
the LSS service provision: the LSS services are governed by a strict entitlement law and to be 
granted LSS services, the functional impairment must be “severe and permanent”. A person 
granted LSS service(s) in one municipality is not necessarily granted the same service(s) if moving 
to  another  municipality; therefore,  migrating  to  another  municipality  is  not  common  among 
those granted LSS services.
16 Furthermore, individuals receiving LSS services one year are most 
likely receiving them the next year as well, so the number of individuals can be seen as exogenous 
with regard to other municipal serv ices. Rather than decreasing the number of individuals who 
are granted LSS services, the resources for providing the LSS service may change (e.g. fewer 
personnel). If there is a change in the resources for providing LSS services, it is not exogenous to 
                                                       
16 A person who has been granted LSS services and wants to move to another municipality must apply six 
months beforehand to the new municipality with regard to the level of service the new municipality will 
offer. 15 
 
the other spending category. So while the LSS expenditure may be correlated with other spending 
categories, the number of individuals receiving LSS services should not be correlated with spending 
and it can therefore be used as an instrument. Both two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) and OLS will 
be used to estimate the equations, and the results from these will be presented in next section.  
 
If  an  increase  in  LSS  expenditure  causes  the  municipal  government  to  systematically  reduce 
spending  on  other  services  (from  the  level  they  would  otherwise  choose),  the  parameter 
estimating the impact of LSS expenditures on the spending category studied should be significant 
and negative. However, if the parameter differed insignificantly from zero, this would indicate 
that the changes in the spending category are determined by changes in exogenous factors only 
and thus, the level of LSS expenditures does not directly affect the choice of spending category. 
If so, this would be interpreted as no evidence or support of the crowding out hypothesis. 
 
Finally, municipality fixed effects are included to control for unobserved municipality factors that 
remain fixed over time. Dummy variables for year fixed effects are also included.  
 
5.  Empirical results and discussion 
In  this  section,  the  regression  results  from  the  five  spending  categories  are  presented  and 
discussed. The section starts out with a test against endogeneity of the LSS expenditure variable, 
followed by a discussion of the validity and relevance of the instruments used. The section ends 
with the presentation and discussion of the regression estimates: the results for elderly & disabled 
care  and  education  spending  are  presented  in  Table  3,  and  the  results  for  social  assistance, 
childcare & preschool, and culture & leisure spending are presented in Table 4.
17  
 
Test against endogeneity  
As discussed in the previous section, the expenditure on some or all of the spending categories 
may be simultaneously decided with the expenditure on LSS. Therefore, a test of whether LSS 
expenditure  can  be  treated  as  exogenous  is  performed.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
                                                       
17  In  the  regressions  where  the  LSS  expenditure  variable  is  endogenous,  the  OLS  estimates  are  just 
included for comparison; vice versa, in the regressions where the LSS expenditure variable can be treated 
as exogenous, the 2SLS estimates are just included for comparison. 16 
 
specified  endogenous  regressor  can  actually  be  treated  as  exogenous,  the  test  statistic  is 
distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom.
18 The test results are presented in Table 2. 
As can be seen in the Table 2, we reject the null hypothesis that LSS expenditure can be treated 
as exogenous in the elderly &   disabled care spending equation as well as in the education 
spending equation. That is, LSS expenditure is simultaneously determined with both these 
spending categories. These results are as expected. The LSS services and elderly & disabled care 
are part of the same service area and the same social service sector  budget; the expenditures are 
therefore decided simultaneously. For education, this result is also as expected. Education is one 
of the two largest sectors within municipality service, and when all ocating budget to the 
educational sector, it will depend on the cost of services to functionally impaired, among other 
things. 
 
Table 2. Test if LSS expenditure per capita can be treated as 
exogenous 
Spending category / 









Elderly & Disabled 
Care  3.28  0.070  Yes  2SLS 
Education  9.63  0.002  Yes  2SLS 
Social Assistance  0.24  0.627  No  OLS 
Childcare & Preschool   0.20  0.655  No  OLS 
Culture & Leisure  1.90  0.168  No  OLS 
 
For the three other categories, social assistance, childcare & preschool, and culture &  leisure, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. That is, LSS expenditure can be treated as exogenous in the 
spending equations for these three categories. For the two latter categories, this is what was 
expected. However, it might be surprising that socia l assistance and LSS expenditure are not 
simultaneously decided, despite being in the same social service sector. The reason for this is 
probably that social assistance is closely regulated in the Social Service Act, and that changes in 
spending on social assistance are not affected by LSS expenditures.  
Validity of instruments  
Since we reject the hypothesis that LSS expenditures can be treated as exogenous for the elderly 
& disabled and education spending categories, instruments are used to obtain unbiased results. 
The instruments chosen must be correlated with the endogenous regressor, but uncorrelated with 
                                                       
18 Degrees of freedom are equal to the number of regressors tested, in this case only one (LSS 
expenditures). 17 
 
the error term (Green, 2003). To test if the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressor,  a  test  of  underidentification  is  performed.  The  hypothesis  –  that  the  excluded 
instruments are not correlated with the endogenous regressor – is rejected for both the elderly & 
disabled care model and the education model; i.e. the instruments are relevant. The test statistic is 
reported in Table 3.  
 
To  test  if  the  instruments  are  uncorrelated  with the  error  term,  an  overidentification  test  is 
performed. The Hansen J-statistic for this test is reported in Table 3. According to the test, for 
both  elderly  &  disabled  care  and  education  spending  categories,  the  hypothesis  that  the 
instruments are valid cannot be rejected, indicating that the instruments are in fact valid. To sum 
up,  the  LSS  expenditure  variable  is  endogenous  in  the  models  for  elderly  &  disabled  care 
expenditure  and  education  expenditure.  Furthermore,  both  the  underidentification  and  the 
overidentification tests confirm that the chosen instruments (the three LSS services variables) are, 
in fact, both valid and relevant instruments.  
Regression results  
Spending on Elderly & disabled care 
Let us start with the elderly & disabled care spending category. As mentioned earlier, if LSS 
expenditure is endogenous in the model(s), the magnitude of the effect of LSS expenditure on 
elderly & disabled care spending will be underestimated by OLS. By comparing OLS and 2SLS 
estimates for spending on elderly & disabled in Table 3, the underestimation (in absolute terms) 
of the effect of LSS expenditure is evident: the OLS estimate is –0.140, while the 2SLS estimate is 
–0.418. From now on, the focus will be on the 2SLS results. In order to support the hypothesis 
that LSS expenditure crowds out other municipal expenditure, the LSS expenditure parameter 
should have a negative and significant effect on the expenditure studied. The result supports this 
hypothesis; it is indeed both negative and highly significant. The point estimate shows that for 
every 100 SEK increase in LSS expenditure, the expenditure on elderly & disabled care decreases 
by approximately 42 SEK.  
 
In the  model that estimates expenditures on elderly  &  disabled care,  the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables for the share of elderly living in special residential homes, tax base, grants, 
and share of elderly, are as expected: all have a positive effect on the expenditure on elderly care 
(i.e. an increase in any of these variables increases the spending on elderly care). The (log) total 18 
 
population and the share of welfare recipients have a negative effect on the expenditure on 
elderly care (i.e. an increase in any of these variables decreases the spending on elderly care).  
 
Table 3. Estimated results for Elderly & Disabled spending and Education spending 
  Dependent Variables  
  Elderly & Disabled Care    Education 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS 
           
LSS expenditure, SEK  -0.140***  -0.418***    0.071*  -0.355** 
  (0.038)  (0.139)    (0.039)  (0.149) 
Elderly with home care  -3.66  -3.07    --  -- 
  (10.23)  (10.04)       
Elderly living in special homes  88.28***  84.81***    --  -- 
  (15.04)  (15.30)       
Tax base t-1  0.074***  0.067***    0.058***  0.048*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Grants t-1  0.202***  0.185***    0.230***  0.204*** 
  (0.028)  (0.029)    (0.026)  (0.028) 
Debt t-1  0.002  0.003    -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.004) 
Ln Population t-1  -17460***  -18866***    3778**  1601 
  (1861)  (2093)    (1767)  (2058) 
Welfare t-1  -60.48***  -54.73***    -39.53**  -30.31* 
  (17.32)  (17.11)    (15.43)  (16.92) 
Share children (0-6) t-1  120.4**  154.9**    -263.4***  -210.1*** 
  (57.84)  (62.71)    (55.37)  (62.21) 
Share youth (7-15) t-1  41.1  62.9    203.7***  236.8*** 
  (43.62)  (45.28)    (46.37)  (50.74) 
Share elderly (75+) t-1  425.7***  480.4***    -169.8***  -86.2 
  (51.88)  (56.46)    (51.98)  (60.60) 
Unemployment  t-1  10.59  -6.540    89.80***  63.97** 
   (24.33)  (26.84)     (26.09)  (29.24) 
Year effects   yes  yes    yes  yes 
Fixed effects   yes  yes    yes  yes 
R-squared (within)  0.664  0.649    0.727  0.698 
Observations  2592  2592    2592  2592 
Number of municipalities  288  288    288  288 
Endogeneity test     3.96      9.63 
    Chi-sq(1) P-value    0.05      0.00 
Underidentification test     71.41      70.86 
    Chi-sq(3) P-value         0.00      0.00 
Hansen J statistic    3.58      3.15 
    Chi-sq(2) P-value     0.17        0.21 
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1  represent  significance  at  the  1,  5  and  10  percent  level,  respectively.  Instruments:  share  of 
individuals receiving LSS services per 10,000 inhabitants, share with the service "adults in residential 
homes", and share with the service "daily activity". Regressions are estimated with the XTIVREG2 




The  OLS  estimate  is  also  underestimated  for  LSS  expenditure  in  the  education  spending 
equation. The OLS estimate is 0.07, while the 2SLS estimate is –0.36. Contrary to the result for 
the  elderly  &  disabled where both the  OLS  and the  2SLS estimate were  negative, the  OLS 
estimate in the education equation is positive and significant at the ten percent level, while the 
2SLS  estimate  is  negative  and  significant  at  the  five  percent  level.  Not  accounting  for  the 
simultaneity bias in the education spending equation would lead to an incorrect conclusion on 
how this sector is affected. Since LSS expenditure is endogenous here, we will focus on the 2SLS 
estimates.  
 
In Table 3, we can see that expenditure on education is negatively and significantly affected by 
the LSS expenditure; once more supporting the crowding out hypothesis. The point estimate 
shows that the expenditure on education approximately decreases by 35 SEK for every 100 SEK 
increase  in  LSS  expenditure.  It  is  evident  that  education  expenditure  is  greatly  affected  by 
increased expenditure on LSS services, despite its being in a different sector. Education is the 
second largest sector of the municipalities. Combined with being an area where municipalities’ 
have the power to decide on how to provide education (although governed by the Education 
Act) – this makes it an area that is easily affected when resources must be reallocated within the 
municipality. For the explanatory variables in the education expenditure model, we can see that 
tax  base,  grants,  share  of  youth,  and  share  of  unemployment  all  have  a  positive  effect  on 
spending on education. The share of young children and the share of welfare recipients have a 
negative effect on education spending.  
 
Social assistance spending 
Let us now move on to the third spending category, social assistance. Since LSS expenditure can 
be treated as exogenous in this equation, the OLS estimates are not biased here as they were in 
the  two  previous  categories.  As  can  be  seen  in  Table  4,  the  LSS  expenditure  parameter  is 
negative, but non significant for the social assistance model. This indicates that LSS expenditure 
does not affect or crowd out spending on social assistance. So even though elderly & disabled 
care, social assistance, and services to functionally impaired together make up the social service 
sector,  only  elderly  &  disabled  care  is  affected  by  the  increasing  expenditure  on  services  to 
functionally impaired. This result may seem surprising. However, since social assistance is strictly 
governed by the Social Service Act, combined with being a small area within the municipality as 
well as within the social service sector, there is no room for its expenditure to be crowded out; 20 
 
the cost will be too high. Therefore, the burden of financing the LSS services might fall on the 
service provision to elderly & disabled care rather than social assistance provision.  
Table 4. Estimated results for Social Assistance, Childcare & Preschool, and Culture & Leisure 
spending.  
  Dependent Variables 
  Social Assistance    Childcare & Preschool    Culture & Leisure 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS 
                 
LSS expenditure, SEK  -0.004  0.020    0.008  0.029    0.006  0.069 
  (0.016)  (0.070)    (0.016)  (0.064)    (0.011)  (0.047) 
Tax base t-1  -0.003  -0.002    0.039***  0.039***    0.010***  0.012*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)    (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Grants t-1  0.017  0.018    0.111***  0.112***    0.039***  0.043*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.013)  (0.017)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Debt t-1  -0.002  -0.002    -0.003*  -0.003*    -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ln Population t-1  -3050***  -2928***    10233***  10342***    906.3  1228** 
  (866.8)  (925.9)    (933.6)  (1014)    (559.4)  (613.6) 
Welfare t-1  98.55***  98.04***    2.58  2.12    -16.43***  -17.79*** 
  (12.19)  (12.12)    (8.37)  (8.42)    (6.03)  (6.32) 
Share children (0-6) t-1  -68.1**  -71.0**    317.1***  314.5***    -47.2***  -55.1*** 
  (31.41)  (32.52)    (33.13)  (34.48)    (17.73)  (19.06) 
Share youth (7-15) t-1  -78.8***  -80.6***    23.4  21.7    3.1  -1.8 
  (24.76)  (25.30)    (23.15)  (23.87)    (15.31)  (15.56) 
Share elderly (75+) t-1  -7.68  -12.33    -2.95  -7.12    10.78  -1.59 
  (27.05)  (30.31)    (28.20)  (30.93)    (18.02)  (19.84) 
Unemployment  t-1  -4.29  -2.86    1.38  2.67    -6.13  -2.31 
   (11.59)  (12.19)     (11.85)  (12.31)     (12.13)  (12.57) 
year effects   yes  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes 
fixed effects   yes  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes 
R-squared (within)  0.320  0.319    0.731  0.731    0.145  0.130 
Observations  2592  2592    2592  2592    2592  2592 
Number of municipalities  288  288    288  288    288  288 
Endogeneity test     0.24      0.20      1.90 
    Chi-sq(1) P-value    0.63      0.66      0.17 
Underidentification test     70.89      70.86      70.86 
    Chi-sq(3) P-value         0.00      0.00      0.00 
Hansen J statistic    3.63      1.48      0.11 
    Chi-sq(2) P-value     0.16        0.48        0.95 
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 represent 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Instruments: share of individuals receiving LSS services per 
10,000 inhabitants, share with the service "adults in residential homes", and share with the service "daily activity". 
Regressions are estimated with the XTIVREG2 command in STATA (Schaffer, M.E. 2007) 
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Childcare & preschool spending 
For the fourth spending equation, childcare & preschool, the LSS expenditure can be treated as 
exogenous. Similarly to the social assistance category, there is no indication that childcare & 
preschool is affected by the increasing expenditure on LSS services. This result is realistic, since 
the spending on childcare & preschool only constitutes a smaller share of the total municipal 
budget. Therefore, it is not likely that the municipalities will make budget cuts in this category in 
order to finance LSS services.  
 
Culture & leisure spending 
Finally, for the last spending category, culture & leisure, it can be seen in Table 4 that the LSS 
expenditure coefficient is once more non significant, showing no evidence of crowding out. Since 
culture & leisure is the only category that is voluntary for the municipalities, it could be expected 
that increasing LSS expenditure would affect spending on culture & leisure in a negative way. 
However, the result indicates that the municipalities choose to reallocate resource from other 
categories, instead of decreasing spending on culture & leisure in order to finance the LSS service 
provision. One reason why the municipalities do not use resources from culture & leisure may be 
that this category is small and a decrease here would be more evident than a similar decrease in a 
larger size category. The results also point toward the fact that the municipalities indeed want to 
provide a certain level of culture & leisure and are therefore reluctant to decrease this spending; 
just to avoid their citizens migrating to other regions, so-called “Tiebout migration”. Although a 
municipality’s expenditure on culture & leisure may not be enough for anybody to migrate, it is a 
visible area and it is likely to act as a signal.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
The focus of this study was to investigate the hypothesis that crowding out occurs within the 
local  governments  with  respect  to  expenditures  on  one  particular  service  area;  services  to 
functionally impaired individuals. It became the responsibility of the municipalities to provide 
this service in 1994 via a reform, and the expenditures on this service have increased ever since. 
While the findings of this study do not support the existence of crowding out for three of the 
five  expenditure  categories  studied  (social  assistance,  childcare  &  preschool  and  culture  & 
leisure), the findings strongly support crowding out of expenditures on elderly & disabled care 
and expenditures on education, both in a statistical and an economic sense.  22 
 
 
The results differ from those in the other studies on expenditure crowding out mentioned in the 
introduction; where none of those studies find support for the crowding out hypothesis. The 
difference between this study and previous studies might be the characteristics of the service area 
studied in this paper. At least three reasons come to mind. First, the area studied, i.e. services to 
the functionally impaired, is regulated via a strong entitlement law; the municipality must provide 
the care and services. Second, the expenditures on these services greatly exceeded the estimated 
costs  (as  predicted  when  the  reform  was  implemented).  For  the  municipality  to  finance  the 
services, it must reallocate resources or crowd out other municipality expenditures. Third, the 
increasing LSS expenditures were not matched by any additional grant or funding for many years. 
This did not happen until 2004 when an intergovernmental LSS expenditure equalization grant 
system was implemented. However, the LSS expenditure equalization grant is not based upon the 
municipalities’ factual costs, instead it is based upon standardized costs calculated and set by the 
national government. Thus, the crowding out of other expenditures is likely to have continued 
also  after  2004.  Therefore,  for  municipalities  to  finance  their  spending  on  services  to  the 
functionally impaired, the result obtained here is very plausible, i.e. the spending on services to 
the functionally impaired crowds out other municipal expenditures. 
 
Naturally,  an  extended  time  series  would  be  useful  for  studying  if  the  crowding  out  of 
expenditure  persists  over  time,  or  if  it  flattens  out.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  study  if 
crowding  out  of  these  expenditures  continues  after  the  new  intergovernmental  expenditure 
equalization system (directed toward expenditures for LSS services) has been fully implemented 
(in  2009).  Although  the  equalization  grant/fee  is  not  based  on  factual  cost  but  rather  on 
standardized calculated cost, it would be interesting to study if this is sufficient for the crowding 
out to vanish.  
 
This  study  shows  the  importance  of  considering  the  effect  on  other  areas  within  the  local 
government service provision when there are reforms, decentralization or national government 
intervention imposing new services on local governments targeted to a specific area. Moreover, 
the different effects on different expenditure categories must be taken into account when new 
services are imposed on local governments, making the findings in this study relevant in terms of 
policy implications and the design of new reforms.  
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Table A. Variable definitions and data sources    
Variable name   Description  Data source 
 
Elderly & disabled care 
spending 
 
The per capita municipal spending on elderly & disabled 




Childcare & pre-school 
spending 
 
The per capita municipal spending on childcare & 






The per capita municipal spending on education 







The per capita municipal spending on social assistance  
(including welfare benefits, expenditures on rehab for 
drug and alcoholic users) calculated in 2007 monetary 




Culture & Leisure 
spending 
 
The per capita municipal spending on culture & leisure  





Expenditures on services 
for functionally impaired 
(LSS) 
 
The per capita municipal spending on services to 
functionally impaired individuals calculated in 2007 





Home service (elderly 
care) 
 
The percentage of the population that receives any type 






Special residence (elderly 
care) 
 
The percentage of the population that lives in special 






Tax base, SEK 
 
Tax base per inhabitant calculated in 2007 monetary 












1998-2004: the municipality's income from general inter-
governmental grants per capita calculated in 2007 monetary 






Debt (long-term), SEK 
 
The municipality's long-term debt per capita calculated in 






























age 0-6, percent 
 






age 7-15, percent 
 







age 75+, percent 
 





LSS Daily Activity, 
percent 
 
The percentage of the "LSS population" that receives the 





LSS Adult Residential 
home, percent 
 
The percentage of the "LSS population" that lives in special 









The number of persons receiving any type of LSS service 




Note: The data sources are SCB = Statistic Sweden; WebOr and Kommundatabasen =  data from SCB 
but with tools to analyze municipalities and counties; NBHW = National Board of Health and Welfare 